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Lessons From the Anticommons:
The Economics of
New York Times Co. v. Tasini*
BY FRANCESCO PARISI*
& CATHERINE §EVCENKO'"
I. FRAGMENTATION AND INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY:
AN ANALYSIS OF NEW YORK TIMES CO. V. TASINI
A. Introduction
The case of New York Times Co. v. Tasini,' which the United States
Supreme Court decided in June 2001, attracted media attention and
involved celebrities such as filmmaker Ken Bums because it appeared to
pit the rights of authors to protect their creative works against the nation's
need to preserve its historical record. The plaintiffs, a group of freelance
* This Article is dedicated to the memory of Margaret B. evdenko, who
provided us with the same invaluable editorial assistance that she gave to countless
others throughout her life.
"" Professor of Law, George Mason University, School of Law & Co-Director,
J.M. Buchanan Center for Political Economy, Program in Economics and the Law.
"'" Legal Writing Fellow, George Mason University School of Law.
1 New York Times Co. v. Tasini, 533 U.S. 483 (2001).
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writers, argued that the New York Times and other defendants were
violating their copyright privileges by selling their works to electronic
database services.2 The defendants responded by arguing that finding for
the plaintiffs would necessitate a wholesale purging of the electronic
records, leaving holes in the nation's historical record that would be
impossible to fill
The three courts that heard the case each responded to this dilemma
differently. The United States District Court for the Southern District of
New York labored mightily to avoid having to retroactively remove all
unauthorized material from electronic databases, a complex and expensive
undertaking, but did so by producing an opinion that required a less than
intuitive interpretation of the 1976 Copyright Act.4 The United States Court
of Appeals for the Second Circuit, opting for a more straightforward
reading of the Copyright Act, reversed the lower court decision5 In doing
so, it placed a premium on statutory construction,6 raising the real
possibility that the publishers wanting the copyright essentially will be
unable to acquire it due to the difficulties of retroactive negotiation with a
large group of freelance writers. The Supreme Court followed the appeals
court's reasoning, playing down the negative ramifications in the hopes that
the two competing concerns-author's rights and accessibility to
information-could be reconciled through the remedy, which the Court
remanded to the district court to determine.7
The specific situation in Tasini is somewhat limited, as the case only
affects freelancers who wrote articles between 1990 and 1993, when
publishers started including electronic rights in contracts with freelancers'
2 See id at 508.
3 Seeid at 519.
4 17 U.S.C. § 201 (1994). For instance, the court compares § 201(c), 201(d)(1),
and 201(d)(2) to point out that, working "in tandem," the three subsections create
a subdivision of rights that leaves publishers with "full authority" over the
subdivisions they acquire. Tasini v. New York Times Co., 972 F. Supp. 804, 815
(S.D.N.Y. 1997).
5 Tasini v. New York Times, 206 F.3d 161 (2d Cir. 1999).
6 Id at 166-68 (citing canons of statutory construction to reject the lower
court's reading of § 201 (c) on the grounds that it would render superfluous another
provision of the Copyright Act).
7 Tasini, 533 U.S. at 519.
' One amicus brief supporting affirmance of the Second Circuit decision
estimated that the case affected .0036% of the 2.8 billion documents available on
NEXIS. Brief of Amici Curiae Ellen Schracker et al. at 11, New York Times Co.
v. Tasini, 533 U.S. 483 (2001) (No. 00-201). It should be noted, however, that this
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Nevertheless, it usefully illustrates concepts familiar to those in the field of
law and economics because the underlying tension between the publishers
and freelancers replicates itself in a variety of circumstances. In fact, Tasini
is, from the law and economic perspective, a classic anticommons situation
in which asymmetric transaction costs are complicating the implementation
of the easiest solution: some form of retroactive compensation to the
authors for use of their work. This paper will review the Tasini case,9
explain some basic concepts in law and economics, and describe some of
the emerging economic theories of property fragmentation and how they
apply to this case.1" After an in-depth consideration of the Supreme Court
decision," the economic model of the anticommons will be explained and
applied to this case. 2 A discussion illustrating how the principles of law
and economics can provide guidance on the open question of how to craft
an effective remedy for Tasini"3 will lead into the final section: a consider-
ation of the doctrine of fair use, which could have provided a solution to
the anticommons dilemma in this case. 4
B. Background of the Case
1. District Court
The underlying facts of the case are relatively simple. A group of
freelance writers sued the New York Times and a few other prominent
publishers for selling their works to various electronic databases such as
NEXIS, which then marketed them to the public at a significant cost. The
authors claimed that this practice violated their copyright rights, and,
accordingly, they demanded that the publishers first acquire their permis-
sion before passing the material onto the electronic databases, thereby
allowing the writers to share in the profits.'
The district court found in favor of the publishers. Section 201 of the
1976 Copyright Act allows compilers of collections of articles (such as a
newspaper or magazine) to use the commissioned works in revisions of the
amounts to copyright questions concerning millions of articles. Id. at 25 n.20.
9See infra notes 15-26 and accompanying text.
'0 See infra notes 27-47 and accompanying text.
" See infra notes 48-75 and accompanying text.
12 See infra notes 76-92 and accompanying text.
3 See infra notes 93-123 and accompanying text.
14 See infra notes 124-42 and accompanying text.
" See Tasini v. New York Times Co., 972 F. Supp. 804, 806 (S.D.N.Y. 1997).
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original collection (e.g., a second edition of the newspaper) or in subse-
quent issues of the same series (such as a later edition of an encyclo-
pedia)." The judge ruled that the redistribution of the articles through
electronic databases constituted an allowable revision of the original work,
rather than an impermissible alteration or independent use, because the
databases preserved the creative element of the publishers' compilation of
an interesting publication each day. 7 The court acknowledged that the
database version does not have any of the initial formatting, photographs,
or captions, and that the juxtaposition to other articles that ran in the
original edition is completely lost, and yet found that it could still be
considered a revision.' In balancing the various elements, therefore, the
court decided that the intellectual effort of putting together a publication,
an effort readily recognized as deserving copyright protection, survived the
process of putting the work in an electronic database.
By downplaying the formatting and presentation differences between
a newspaper or magazine and an electronic database, the district court was
able to find that licensing articles to an electronic database was simply an
allowable revision of the original work. This avoided the practical
difficulties that would ensue if publishers had to find all of their freelancers
and obtain licenses to include their works on electronic database services.
The publishers would have continued to license material to electronic
database services without further compensation to the freelancers. The
result would have been a net zero increase of transaction costs for the
publishers but an effective denial to the writers of a share in the substantial
profits derived from selling access to commercial databases.19 The district
court recognized this inequity, but it argued that the problem lay with
advances in technology that had rendered the revisions right, which in 1976
was seen as being of limited value, suddenly "precious" in the context of
electronic dissemination." The ultimate solution, therefore, was within the
purview of Congress, rather than the courts.2'
16 17 U.S.C. § 201(c) (1994).
'7 Tasini, 972 F. Supp. at 823 (noting that "selecting materials to be included
in a newspaper or magazine is a highly creative endeavor .... Identifying 'all the
news that's fit to print' is not nearly as mechanical (or noncontroversial) a task as
gathering all of the phone numbers for a particular region").
'8 Id at 824-25.
19 Id at 826.20 Id at 826-27.
21 Id at 827.
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2. Appeals Court
The Second Circuit reversed the district court, however, holding that
§ 201 (c) does not allow publishers to license individual copyrighted works
for inclusion in electronic databases.' The court rejected the argument that
placement in a database constituted a revision, finding that it was not
reasonable to find that a database, which holds tens of thousands of articles
from a variety of publications, could be considered a revised version of
each original publication.z The court explained its reasoning by applying
rules of statutory construction, claiming that the three clauses of § 20 1(c)
set the floor, middle ground, and ceiling of allowable uses of material
acquired for a collectivework. The "natural reading" of the "revisions"
provision was to allow later editions of a newspaper, which are "somewhat
altered" from the original output.' If the understanding of the term
"revision" were stretched to allow inclusions in databases, the final clause
-permission for inclusion in later works-would be superfluous, an
interpretation that could not be "squared with basic canons of statutory
construction."' Allowing electronic dissemination would have the
additional incongruous result that publishers could not sell individual hard
copies of freelance articles, but they could achieve the same end indirectly
by selling copies electronically with a print-out function Accordingly, the
Second Circuit found in favor of the freelancers, prompting an appeal to the
Supreme Court.
C. The Prism of Law and Economics
Before considering the Supreme Court decision, this paper will outline
some economic models of fragmented property that will facilitate
understanding of this case. The gravamen of Tasini is the extent to which
the freelancers seconded their rights to the New York Times to disseminate
their work. In short, the writers created a concurrent "subright" in their
copyright.2' The traditional structure of a property right, in which owners
2 See Tasini v. New York Times, 206 F.3d 161, 165 (2d Cir. 1999).
' Id at 167. The court noted that neither side was trying to argue that a
database could be considered an original collective work or a later collective work
in the same series, the other two permissible later uses of materials acquired for a
collective work under § 201(c). Id at 166.
24 Id at 167.
z Id
2 See id. at 168.
27 Tasini v. New York Times Co., 972 F. Supp. 804, 815 (S.D.N.Y. 1997).
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enjoy a "bundle of rights," breaks down when they sell off some of their
rights, while retaining others. This is easily understood in terms of real
property: for instance, a tract of land with an easement is subjected to the
rights of two parties. The difficulties begin when one party wants to reunify
the rights associated with that piece of property. This Article reviews the
analytic models for understanding this situation: the Coase Theorem, the
various ramifications of asymmetric transaction costs, and the increasing
difficulties that ensue when fragmented property rights are held by multiple
owners: veto power over the reunification, or joint use, of a resource;
persistent fragmentation;" and underutilization of the property (anticom-
mons situation). Although these models were developed for consideration
of real property, they facilitate understanding of the Tasini case as well.
1. Coase Theorem
The theory of law and economics is increasingly seen as a valuable
practical tool in the courtroom.29 In this case, the conflict between the
freelancers and the New York Times and NEXIS fits several standard law
and economics models. For instance, the core of the problem is that the
New York Times does not have an easy way to track down the freelancers
who contributed to the paper over the last ten to fifteen years and renegoti-
ate the terms of the article with each of them. The Coase Theorem states
that if all rights are freely transferable and transaction costs are zero, an
inefficient initial partitioning of property rights will not prevent an efficient
final use of the resources? Simply put, property owners would have
28 In a recent paper, Francesco Parisi introduced the analogy of entropy in
property law, suggesting that legal systems develop a kind of gravitational force
that counteracts a natural tendency towards property fiagmentation (i.e., entropy),
thereby preventing property rights from becoming so splintered that use ofthe land
is no longer economically viable. See Francesco Parisi, Entropy in Property, 50
AM. J. COMP. L. (forthcoming 2002).
29 For instance, a concurring opinion in a recent remand by the Mississippi
Supreme Court expressly recommended using Judge Learned Hand's formula to
determine a coal company's liability, if any, for coal dust that settled on a rice
shipment, rendering it unusable. Comet Delta, Inc. v. Pate Stevedore Co., 521 So.
2d 857, 862 (Miss. 1988) (Robertson, J., concurring). Similarly, the Coase
Theorem has also informed some judicial thinking. See, e.g., In re Stotler & Co.,
144 B.R. 385, 393 (Bankr. N.D. Ill. 1992).
30 In a world of zero transaction costs, an efficient allocation of resources
occurs regardless of 1) the initial allocation, or degree of fragmentation, ofthe legal
entitlement and 2) the choice of remedies to protect the resources in question.
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unlimited opportunities either to fragment or to reunify fragmented
property, achieving the most efficient use of their rights. In the current case,
the freelancers and the New York Times would simply renegotiate the terms
of their original deal to allow the current practice to continue.
Once the ideal conditions of the positive Coase Theorem are relaxed,
however, the efficiency of the final allocation depends on the initial
division of resources. In a world of rational actors with full information,
accurate estimation of the optimal final allocation and knowledge of the
relative magnitude of discounted costs and benefits of property reallocation
over time will determine the best initial allocation.3? ' The ex ante choice of
the owners will ultimately prove efficient, thereby minimizing the
undesirable effects of the positive transaction costs that would be associ-
ated with correcting a suboptimal initial allocation.32 This is reflected in the
fact that the New York Times and other publishers have come to understand
the monetary value and public benefit of electronic rights and now
routinely include permission to resell freelance articles to electronic
database services in their contracts with freelancers 3 With this complete
understanding of the technology and its implications, the problem of who
controls the electronic rights has been negotiated out of existence. We are
rather dealing with the lingering effects of earlier, uninformed choices by
both parties.
Uncertainty regarding the final optimal allocation of a given property
right means that the efficiency of the initial distribution of rights depends
on the likelihood that it will coincide with what turns out to be the optimal
final allocation and the directional costs of reallocating rights in the event
of an initial mistake. If transaction costs are endogenous (i.e., they depend
on the legal system, contracting parties, or the social planner), then the
Ronald H. Coase, The Problem ofSocial Cost, 3 J.L. & EcON. 1, 10 (1960).
"' In many cases, this might not be a difficult undertaking. The subdivision of
a lot, or sale of one of the property "bundle of rights" (e.g., creation of an
easement), is often beneficial, as is fragmentation ofa large estate into lots that can
then be developed forresidential orcommercial usethat will benefit the community
as a whole.
32 In a world with full information, rational agents would act rationally. The
multiple owners would be able to optimize the use of their property, avoiding
positive transaction (or transfer) costs, reaching the same ideal equilibrium that
could be achieved in a world of zero transaction costs. In short, under these ideal
conditions, transaction (or transfer) costs do not impede the optimal final allocation
of resources because that optimal final allocation would be rationally anticipated
and such a solution would be chosen from the outset.
33Tasini v. New York Times Co., 972 F. Supp. 804,807 n.2 (S.D.N.Y. 1997).
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issue of fragmentation becomes a relevant economic, and ultimately legal,
problem.
2. Origins of Property Fragmentation
Ontological Sources. It is not surprising that economic theories of
fragmented property are germane to the Tasini case. Persistent property
fragmentation results from two scenarios, both of which apply to this
situation. First, human creative efforts often involve property rights over
various material and, therefore, are by definition ontologically fragmented.
Because the creation of intellectual property is by its nature decentralized,
initial ownership of the various parts of a creative work is dispersed, be it
in the components of a computer game (programming, graphics, music),
major Hollywood film (story, script, music, special effects), or newspaper
(articles, photographs, illustrations, op-ed pieces). In such cases, the
scattered ownership of ideas and inventions is not the result of inefficient
or irrational human choices, but is inherent to the decentralized process of
human creation in a market economy. In short, it is natural that a publica-
tion that purports to deliver "all the news that's fit to print" should avail
itself of the creative talents of various professionals, and that the arrange-
ments it has with its various contributors should not be uniform.
Subsequent voluntary exchange is a weak weapon for fighting the
ontological dispersion of property rights because the various property
owners must contend with a range of factors that impede the unification of
fragmented rights. Although the foregone synergies among the various
property fragments may be obvious, multiple dispersed owners may not be
able to cooperate, resulting in the monopoly pricing of the various inputs.
In short, it may be quite costly to unify dispersed property, making it
impossible to avoid final property allocations that are less than optimal.
Rational Choice. Property fragmentation may also result from
deliberate human choice. Recent law and economics literature points out
that the initially rational choices that led to property fragmentation may not
be reversed, even if the arrangement is no longer desirable, because of the
strategic impediments to reunification. In economic terms, the process of
property fragmentation is characterized by asymmetric transaction costs.35
" See Michael A. Heller, The Boundaries of Private Property, 108 YALE L.J.
1163 (1999); Parisi, supra note 28.
" For example, the original owner will be at a disadvantage in reunifying his
rights into a fee simple because he will have to deal with various parties who have
acquired some rights pertaining to the original parcel. This kind of difficulty arises
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A single owner faces no strategic costs when deciding how to partition his
property and so may subdivide his parcel, or grant easements, because
giving several different parties rights to what was exclusively his land
appears economically desirable at that point in time. But unlike ordinary
transfers of rights from one individual to another, reunifying fragmented
property rights usually involves transaction and strategic costs higher than
those incurred in the original deal,36 which will plague any subsequent
attempt to reunify the fragmented property. 7 Even reversing a simple
property transaction can result in monopoly pricing by the buyer-turned-
seller who is trying to extract as much profit from the transaction as
possible, knowing full well the value of the property to the other party.
Reunifying property that has been split among multiple parties, whether
from its creation or at a later time, engenders even higher costs given the
increased difficulty of coordination among the parties.3s
These reunification costs increase monotonically depending both on the
extent of fragmentations and the synergies and complementarities between
the owners of the property fragments. Control by a group ofnon-confonn-
ing owners leads to strategic considerations that increase the transaction
costs of any attempted reunification of the original property and, in their
most extreme form, can eventually make the economically more efficient
use impossible to arrange,39 foreclosing the possibility of taking advantage
of the resource at all.
3. Entropy
The fundamental law of entropy in property creates a one-directional
bias towards increasing fragmentation. The term "entropy" refers to the
often when closely associated property rights, such as the rights to use land and to
exclude others from it, are separated. Nonconformity between use and exclusion
rights (and more generally, between any two complementary elements ofa property
right) often give rise to asymmetric transaction and strategic costs.
36 See FRANCESCO PARISI ETAL., DUALITY IN PROPERTY: COMMONS AND ANTI-
COMMONS 14 (Univ. of Va. L. & Econ., Working Paper No. 00-16, Gee. Mason
Univ. L. & Econ., Working Paper No. 00-32, 2000).
3 Directional costs will be high when multiple non-conforming co-owners are
faced with a range ofstrategic problems stemming from difficulties in coordinating
their decisions vis a vis the party who wants to reunify the property. See id
3 See, e.g., Egidi v. Town of Libertyville, 621 N.E.2d 615 (Ill. App. Ct. 1993)
(remanding the case after an appeal and previous remand to get more information
concerning the possible intent of one of the involved parties to abandon an
easement).
3 Ronald Coase came to the same conclusion concerning the law of nuisance.
See Coase, supra note 30, at 10.
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second law of thermodynamics, according to which every process that can
occur spontaneously will go in one direction only and will result in a
release of energy that cannot be recaptured, so that the amount of entropy,
or lost energy, in the universe will continually increase. Entropy can only
be avoided in the purely abstract world of zero transaction costs, where
parties could without cost negotiate to the most efficient allocation of
resources. The economic forces that induce entropy in property were
considered above.4 Property division creates a one-directional inertia;
unlike ordinary transfers of rights from one individual to another, reunify-
ing fragmented property rights usually involves transaction and strategic
costs higher than those incurred in the original deal.4' As in the physical
world, where it takes considerable additional energy to roll a rock back up
a hill after it has rolled down on its own, it takes considerable financial and
legal effort to unite property rights that are diffusely owned or had been
previously split. Often, especially in the presence of asymmetric transaction
costs or a situation in which multiple owners can prevent use of the land or,
in this case, electronic publication of articles, that reunification will never
take place. To continue our physical analogy, the foregone efficient use is
analogous to the expenditure of energy in thermodynamics, which will also
never be recouped.
4. Application to Tasini
Here, the New York Times is reluctant to reunify the de facto property
rights it had in each edition of the paper, and which were split by the
Supreme Court ruling, because of the large transaction costs it would face
in doing so. Tracking down, and negotiating with, the hundreds of
freelancers that contributed material during the period in question is a
potentially daunting task. Estimates of the amount it would cost the Times
to compensate and/or pay damages for the freelancers' material range from
$640,000 to billions of dollars.42 The paper understandably prefers to
I0 Heller cites the nursery rhyme of Humpty Dumpty to illustrate his point
When Humpty Dumpty is shattered into pieces, all the king's horses and all the
king's men cannot re-assemble him, which stands in contrast to the ease with which
he broke into pieces in the first place. See Heller, supra note 34, at 1169.
" Parisi, Schulz, and Depoorter observe that even reversing a simple property
transaction can result in monopoly pricing by the buyer-turned-seller; reunifying
property that has been split among multiple parties engenders even higher costs
given the increased difficulty of coordination among the parties. PARAs! ET AL.,
supra note 36.
42 Felicity Barringer, Freelancers SuingAgain on Copyright, N.Y. TIMEs, July
6,2001, at C4.
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threaten to purge the electronic databases of the freelancers' material.
Whether this strategy will be effective remains to be seen: Tasini has filed
another lawsuit against the New York Times and other defendants to block
this approach, demanding thatthe companies instead provide compensation
for the work of freelance writers.43
Managing property fragmentation was a major consideration in Tasini
because the 1976 Copyright Act created the possibility of subdividing
copyright rights for the express purpose of facilitating the licensing for
collective works.' The 1906 Copyright Act only allowed copyright to vest
in one party at a time; anyone who allowed their work to be used in a
collection would lose the copyright completely.4 In an effort to correct this
inequity, the 1976 Copyright Act rejected the concept of unitary copyright,
allowing authors to cede part of their rights to third parties for specific
purposes under limited conditions.' All of the courts that have considered
the Tasini case agreed that the original authors retained the right to their
creative work, and all agreed that the publishers did not obtain rights to that
work. Rather, the authors who allowed their work to be published yielded
a "subright" to the publisher, the scope of which is very limited. At the
same time, however, the publishers created their own copyright in the
creative process of putting together the collective work. The gravamen of
Tasini is therefore determining whether the distribution of authors' works
electronically fits within the narrow confine of the exceptions in the 1976
Act and how the electronic format impacts the collective nature of the
work, if at all.47 Having decided that copyright can be split into constituent
43Id.
' "Copyright in each separate contribution to a collective work is distinct from
copyright in the collective work as a whole, and vests initially in the author of the
contribution." 17 U.S.C. § 201(c) (1994).4
1 See the discussion in Tasini v. New York Times Co., 972 F. Supp. 804, 815
(S.D.N.Y. 1997). The provisions ofthe 1976 Copyright Actwere designed to avoid
that outcome. See 17 U.S.C. § 201(c).
46 The relevant section of the Copyright Act of 1976 reads:
Copyright in each separate contribution to a collective work is distinct from
copyright in the collective work as a whole, and vests initially in the author
of the contribution. In the absence of an express transfer of the copyright
or of any rights under it, the owner of copyright in the collective work is
presuned to have acquired only the privilege of reproducing and distribut-
ing the contribution as part of that particular collective work, any revision
of that collective work, and any later collective work in the same series.
17 U.S.C. § 201(c).
"I "The determinative issue here, then, is the precise scope of these 'privi-
leges."' Tasini, 972 F. Supp. at 814.
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parts, the courts are now working to avoid the problems associated with
fragmentation of physical property, as outlined above. They are doing this
by interpreting the ceded rights very narrowly; some dispute arises when
(1) narrow construction could be seen as taking away the publishers' rights
and (2) a new cost (negative externality) is created, in this case the
reduction of accessibility to information.
II. THE SUPREME COURT DECISION
A. Opinion
The Supreme Court wrestled with the objective outlined in this
Article-forestalling property fragmentation-and determined by a 7-2
margin that the authors' rights must be paramount. The Supreme Court
explained that the case turned on two distinct copyrights of the same
material: the rights of the authors in the work itself and the rights of the
publishers to the collective work, a product of the creative work of
assembling the different pieces into one publication." The majority
decided, however, that the conversion to database format reduces the
articles to individual works, rather than as contributions to a collective
whole, so that to allow the publishers further control over the articles in the
medium would "invade the core of the Author's exclusive rights."49
The Court contrasted the pre-1976 copyright position with the current
legislation, noting that indivisible copyright had been abolished in the 1976
Copyright Act, and also cataloged the injustices that had led to that
legislative decision50 Specifically, if an author allowed his work to be used
in a collective work before 1976, he lost the copyright because it either
passed to the publisher or would fall into the public domainO' The
Copyright Act was drafted to compensate for this inequity, 2 striving to
preserve the author's copyright and forestalling the "unqualified transfer"
of rights to the owner of the collective work. 3 The objective was to
strengthen the economic incentive to produce creative work and to ensure
that if the collective work increased demand for the article, the author
48 See New York Times Co. v. Tasini, 533 U.S. 483, 512 (2001).
4 9 1d at 516.
'0 Id at 512-13.
"' Id A freelance author could retain a copyright in such a case if "the article
was printed with a copyright notice in the author's name." Id Publishers, however,
have superior bargaining power and can refuse to print the notices. Id
52S ee id. at 513.
531 d. at 513-14.
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would benefit.' Therefore, absent an express agreement, "the owner of
copyright in the collective work is presumed to have acquired only the
privilege of reproducing and distributing the contribution as part of that
particular collective work, any revision of that collective work, and any
later collective work of the same series." 55
The Court refused to construe the statute in such a way as to diminish
an author's exclusive rights to his material, so that only if the databases
constituted a clear revision of the original collective work could the district
court decision be upheld0 The Court was concerned that the articles in the
database would appear out of context and that users are generally prompted
to search for information by category rather than by date or publication, the
aspects that would tie the article to the original collective work. In addition,
NEXIS removes all formatting, graphics, and advertising-other character-
istics that would hearken back to the original version. The Court therefore
concluded that the database is no more a revision of an article than a 400-
page novel is a revision of a sonnet that might be quoted in the book.57 By
distributing articles singly, the databases "invade the Authors' exclusive
rights under § 106. '8
The Court considered whether the creative effort of putting togetherthe
collective work was sufficiently preserved once each edition of the paper
was converted into electronic format. In concluding that it was not, the
majority found that the collective aspect was sufficiently diluted that the
copyright in the original work would trump the right in the creative process
of assembling "All the News That's Fit to Print."' 9 Accordingly, the
Supreme Court upheld the decision of the Second Circuit, holding that the
publishers were not covered by § 201 (c) because articles in databases could
be retrieved individually, completely divorced from the collective work in
which they were published.' Therefore, the databases could not be
considered "revisions,"61 and the publishers had infringed the copyrights of
the writers.62 The Court rejected the district court's finding that the coding
and electronic tags were sufficient to preserve the essence of the collective
work, and therefore the publishers could claim copyrights under the
14 See id
55 17 U.S.C. § 201(c) (1994).
Tasini, 533 U.S. at 515.
17Id at 515-16.
51Id at 516.
19 Id at 525.
60Id at 515-19.
61Id at 518.
6 Id at 508-09.
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"revision" portion of§ 201(c).63 Rather, the appeals court argument that the
database collections constituted entirely new anthologies proved more
persuasive."
In sum, the Court minimized fragmenting the right to the material by
declaring that the authors' rights remained intact regardless of the narrow
rights that publishers acquired to include the material in a collective work.
Once the publishers acted to remove their copyright from the narrow zone
of protection offered by the 1976 Act, the authors' right to the material was
effectively the only one remaining.
B. Dissent
The dissent followed the lead of the district court, delving into
legislative history to support a reading of the Copyright Act that avoided
the problem of restricting access to the freelancers' works, rather than
speculating that it simply would not arise, as did the majority.65 The dissent
broke the question down into two issues: whether the electronic versions
of the collective works are "revisions" within the meaning of § 201(c)
(yes)' and, if so, whether the electronic medium of the database "changes
the equation" (no).67 Finally, the dissent echoed the logic of the district
6 3Id. at 510.
64See id 511-12.6
' See id at 520-31 (Stevens, J., dissenting).
66 See id at 520 (Stevens, J., dissenting). After a close examination of copyright
law before 1976, the dissent quotes the legislative record to demonstrate that the
primary purpose of the Act was to preserve the authors' rights to their contributions
in collective works to preclude the publishers from either changing the text itself
or including it in an entirely different publication. Publishing the freelancers' work
in databases therefore falls within the parameters of what Congress was trying to
protect, namely the preservation of the legal claim of the original authors to their
work. Id at 522, 527-28 (Stevens, J., dissenting). The dissent also did not see how
format could be dispositive in determining whether something was a revision or
not; otherwise publishing the collective work in Braille would also have to be
unacceptable-clearly not the case. Id. at 524 (Stevens, J., dissenting). The mere
act of converting a document into ASCII (an electronic text format), and thereby
giving up the original page formatting, could not be the source of the problem. See
id (Stevens, J., dissenting).
67 The majority found that documents in a database could not be a revision of
the original work because New York Times articles from different editions would
be co-mingled and presented out of context. Id at 516-17. The dissent, however,
did not see how this juxtaposition would be any different than making the two
editions available in a library or storing several editions ofa paper on a single spool
ofmicrofilm. The legislation is simply silent on the extent to which the material can
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court by concluding that this reading of the statute may not be the only
possible interpretation, but that it is nevertheless plausible and "entirely
faithful to the statute's purposes ' and is much more sound from a policy
perspective. Copyright is essentially an attempt to capture the benefit that
the public derives from a creative literary work (in economic terms, an
externality) and to return that benefit to the author as a way to maintain an
incentive for people to make cultural contributions.69 It is not designed to
guarantee the highest remuneration to authors, but is rather a mechanism
for balancing between the need for broad public availability of art,
literature, and music and finding a way to create incentives for people to
produce those goods.70
In calculating the costs to the freelancers, Justice Stevens argued that
the majority's opinion failed to take into account the oversetting benefits
that freelancers, who may be less well-known, will accrue from the
increased exposure their works will get from being available electroni-
cally-benefits that could even include enhancement of the value of the
copyright they still hold in the work itself.7 Put against the obvious cost of
having databases that are no longer comprehensive,72 Stevens argued that
the majority was improperly ignoring the underlying object of copyright
law as enshrined in the Constitution: maintenance of a balance between
authorial and public rights. In this case, the public interest had been
dismissed.'
In his dissent, Justice Stevens dealt at length with the problem of pub-
lishers purging their databases, thereby limiting access to an important
segment of the nation's historical record. 4 The economic model for the
situation in which a group of people, who cannot coordinate, limits access
to an important resource is known as the tragedy of the anticommons and
is described below. 5
C. The Tragedy of the Anticommons
The problem of the commons is well known: all members of a group
have unrestricted access to a resource and cannot coordinate among
be manipulated and still be considered a revision. Id at 527 (Stevens, J.,
dissenting).
, Id at 527 (Stevens, J., dissenting).
6 Id at 528 (Stevens, J., dissenting).
70Id (Stevens, J., dissenting).
' Id at 529 (Stevens, J., dissenting). But see id at 514 n.6.
72 Id at 531 (Stevens, J., dissenting).
See id at 528 (Stevens, J., dissenting).
74 Id at 528-29 (Stevens, J., dissenting).
7 See discussion infra Part ll.C.
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themselves to manage it efficiently. The inverse, the tragedy of the
anticommons, is a result of property fragmentation. In an anticommons
situation, multiple owners have veto powers over the use of a resource,
thereby increasing the chances that it will not be used.76 Competition
among the owners prompts exercise of exclusion rights, even if one party
could use the resource to create social benefits. Just as users do not fully
bear all the costs associated with using the resource in the commons
situation, in the anticommons model, multiple owners do not fully
internalize the cost created by the enforcement of their right to exclude
others." This compresses the co-owners' right of use, potentially even
eliminating it. The commons and anticommons deviate from the norm in
symmetric directions. "In commons situations, the right to use stretches
beyond the effective right (or power) to exclude others. Conversely, in
anticommons situations, the co-owners' right of use is compressed, and
potentially eliminated, by an overshadowing right of exclusion held by
other co-owners."78 Put another way, in both commons and anticommons
cases, "rights of use and rights of exclusion have non-conforming bound-
aries,"79 which "causes a welfare loss from the foregone synergies between
those complementary features of a unified property right."80
76 See PARISI ET AL., supra note 36, at 2-3; James Buchanan & Yong J. Yoon,
Symmetric Tragedies: Commons and Anticommons, 43 J.L. & EcON. 1 (2000);
Heller, supra note 34, at 1166.
7 PARIsI ET AL., supra note 36, at 2.
78 Id at3.
79 Id
"' Id For a public policy example of anticommons, consider efforts at environ-
mental protection through assertion of rights. The Seventh Circuit reversed a
potential anticommons situation in River RoadAlliance, Inc. v. Corps ofEngineers
of the U.S. Army, 764 F.2d 445 (7th Cir. 1985), in which the court lifted an
injunction preventing the Army Corps of Engineers from creating a fleeting
facility-essentially a parking lot for barges-in a pristine area along the banks of
the Mississippi. In his decision, Judge Richard Posner agreed with the Corps'
determination that the detrimental effect on the area would be purely aesthetic and
therefore not significant enough to warrant a full environmental impact statement
by the Army Corps of Engineers. Id at 451. Such an undertaking would be long
and expensive. Id at 449. The majority was not willing to allow the River Alliance,
joined in the suit by the State of Illinois, to exert anticommons-type exclusion
rights by insisting on full implementation of the range of federal regulations and
by enjoining the construction ofthe fleeting facility inthe meantime. By attempting
to assert the right to a full environmental impact statement, the plaintiffs were
delaying use of the resource. Id at 448. Had the defendant had fewer legal
resources at its disposal than that of the United States government, that action
might have been sufficient to block the construction of the barge facility.
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The anticommons application in Tasini is clear: each of the authors
now retains control over the copyright to the work that was published in the
New York Times. The paper is currently either unwilling, or unable, to
negotiate with each one of these writers for the rights, so that the informa-
tion they have provided will no longer be readily available in electronic
format. An important resource, therefore, will be underutilized, given the
growing reliance that people are placing on immediate electronic access to
information. The extent of the underutilization is a matter of dispute, as the
availability of the information in hardcopy or microfilm is disputed." The
practical result of the Tasini decision necessitates, in theory, that the
publishers track down every freelance author since 1976 and negotiate
usage rights. Not only does this in itself threaten to engender huge costs,
but it would lead to asymmetric transaction costs, as the authors could
certainly hold out for higher licensing fees. A database's worth (and
justification of high access charges) lies in the fact that it is comprehensive.
Writers would know this and therefore demand premium licensing
compensation, knowing that electronic database services, such as NEXIS,
Recent legislation has given individuals the capacity to sue to prevent
environmental damage, however, effectively creating a situation in which multiple
parties with ownership-type rights can prevent economic use of the resource. See,
e.g., Endangered Species Act, 16 U.S.C. §§ 1531, 1540(g) (1994); Clean Water
Act, 33 U.S.C. § 1365 (1994). Although the question of standing remains an issue
for interested parties, the Supreme Court has upheld the much lowered bar
established by Congress in recent environmental protection legislation. For
instance, in Friends of the Eartk Inc. v. Laidlaw Environmental Services (TOC),
Inc., 528 U.S. 167 (2000), the Supreme Court granted standing to Friends of the
Earth, finding that the plaintiff's voluntary avoidance of the river, because it might
have been polluted by the defendant's actions, was sufficient injury to establish
standing. Id at 182-83. Although granting standing does not guarantee that the
plaintiff will prevail in court, the liberalized standard in environmental cases
increases the likelihood of anticommons outcomes because 1) private citizens
concerned about the environment will be encouraged to sue and 2) smaller
developers may be more apt to abandon a project than risk expensive and time-
consuming litigation, and further damage payments, even if they may ultimately
prevail. Therefore, new standing rules in environmental cases may well provide a
range of examples of the anticommons model in the coming years.
"I For a complete discussion, compare the Bums and American Library
Association ("ALA") amicus briefs submitted to the Supreme Court in this case.
Brief for Amici Curiae Ken Bums et al. at 12-14, New York Times Co. v. Tasini,
533 U.S. 483 (2001) (No. 00-201); BriefofAmici Curiae American Library Ass'n
and Ass'n of Research Libraries at 2, 13, New York Times Co. v. Tasini, 533 U.S.
483 (2001) (No. 00-201).
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would have to comply in order to maintain their market value. The
publishers have reacted swiftly to this new reality: they claim that they will
be forced to delete all freelance materials from their electronic databases
in order to avoid liability for lawsuits.' As stated in their brief, the results
could be far-reaching and devastating:
Petitioners and those similarly situated will have no alternative but to
destroy any CD-ROMs that contain freelance articles and remove all
freelance contributions from electronic libraries, because they obviously
cannot locate and negotiate with thousands of freelance authors, their
heirs and/or assigns, in the face ofthe "tidal wave" of lawsuits respondent
Tasini has threatened and has now begun to deliver. In fact, publishers
across the nation already have assembled instructions for their electronic
copy licensees to begin the deletion process; but for the stay granted
below and this Court's having granted certiorari, the nation's electronic
archives would already have been rendered egregiously incomplete.
8 3
This stand-offcould result in a stark anticommons problem, namely that the
multiple ownership rights will prevent the general public from being able
to access easily the information stored within the work of freelance
journalists. If these resources are only available in hard copies in libraries,
while similar works are available on-line, the collective information and
analysis of thousands of freelance writers, including stringers, writers of
op-ed pieces, and other voluntary contributors, will be underutilized.
Because the authors have no way to coordinate an optimal price for the
rights to their work or to negotiate in tandem with publishers, thereby
creating a cost-effective mechanism for solving this problem,'" it is likely
that the availability of such resources will be limited.85
Nor does this appear to be a fanciful argument. An array of publishing
organizations submitted amicus briefs to the Supreme Court in this case
portraying the drastic results if the appeals court decision were allowed to
stand. For example, a brief from twenty-three publishers, including the
82 Christopher Stem, Freelance Writers Fightfor Share ofOnline Profit, WASH.
POST, Mar. 28,2001, at El.
83 Brief for Petitioner at 49, Tasini v. New York Times Co., 533 U.S. 483
(2001) (No. 00-201) (citations omitted).
" Some have suggested that the answer is the creation of licensing cooperatives
for freelance writers. See Josh J. May, Note, Tasini v. New York Times Co., 16
BERKELEY TECH. L.J. 13, 26 (2001).
85 Indeed, a search for "Tasini" on LEXIS at the time of this writing does not
produce any "hits."
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Washington Post, the Newspapers Association of America, Knight-Ridder,
and Gannett, warned that:
If the Second Circuit's decision stands, existing comprehensive archives
will fall, and historians, researchers, scholars, journalists and society at
large will no longer have meaningful access to the rough draft of the
nation's history contained in back issues of the nation's newspapers and
magazines. A generation ofjoumalists, students and researchers will have
to re-learn the old method of traveling to a brick-and-mortar library, if
they are lucky enough to live near one that still retains paper archives of
the magazines and newspapers they want to review.86
This analysis was seconded in anotherbrief submitted by distinguished film
maker Ken Bums, historians Doris Kearns Goodwin, David McCullough,
and others who fear that libraries will not have the funds to maintain both
electronic and paper copies of important resources. These amici also fear
that it may already be too late to reconstruct paper copies of some of the
material that seemingly will have to be deleted from electronic databases
since the Supreme Court did not adopt the district court's approach to this
issue. 7
The counter-argument, as represented in amicus briefs to the Court and
in its actual opinion, maintains that although the Second Circuit's ruling
presents a challenge, careful crafting ofludicial remedies, including making
any relief prospective or assigning damages instead of an injunction, would
both satisfy the letter of the Copyright Act and preserve the nation's
historical record." The extent of "damage" to the historical record is also
a matter of debate, with another group of historians, led by Ellen Schrecker
of Yeshiva University, arguing that researchers rely on primary sources,
rather than electronic databases, which only go back about twenty years. 9
In rendering its decision, the Supreme Court did not solve the problem.
We are left with a situation in which asymmetric transaction costs have
created an anticommons situation that is preventing the most efficient use
" Brief for Amici Curiae Advance Publications, Inc. et al. at 4, New York
Times Co. v. Tasini, 533 U.S. 483 (2001) (No. 00-201).
"7 Brief for Amici Curiae Ken Bums et al. at 12-14, New York Times Co. v.
Tasini, 533 U.S. 483 (2001) (No. 00-201).
8 Brief of Amici Curiae American Library Ass'n and Ass'n of Research
Libraries at 2, 13, New York Times Co. v. Tasini, 533 U.S. 483 (2001) (No. 00-
201).
9 BriefofAmici Curiae Ellen Schrecker et al. at 10, New York Times Co. v.
Tasini, 533 U.S. 483 (2001) (No. 00-201).
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of the property. The consequences of allowing the impediments to
reunification to remain in place seem very steep. Indeed, the Court itself
appears to be relying on the remedy to resolve the situation. Noting that an
injunction was not mandatory, it left "remedial issues open for initial airing
and decision in the District Court." Law and economics theory stipulates
that the district court should gravitate toward the most efficient remedy at
hand. It would therefore be instructive to consider how other courts have
addressed anticommons problems in other contexts.
Because the appeals court's reading of the statute was more straightfor-
ward, the Court fulfilled, by a 7-2 margin, predictions that it would uphold
the decision of that court.9 Although acknowledging some of the difficul-
ties that may flow from this decision, the Court tried to avoid fulfillment of
the catastrophic scenarios presented by the newspapers by remanding the
case for further consideration of a remedy. The Court also remarked
pointedly that injunction of use of the freelancers' material would not be
the lower court's only recourse.' Given that the concerns about availability
of information is at least plausible, it is useful to apply the economic
concepts described earlier in this section to the Tasini context in order to
understand more fully the implications of the decision and how some of the
more costly results might be avoided.
III. REMEDIES AND ENDOGENOUS TRANSACTION COSTS
Economic efficiency is explicitly cited as a basis for judicial creativity
in determining the most appropriate remedies.9 According to a well-known
formulation of the normative Coase theorem, in the presence of transaction
costs, the choice of remedial protection will have an impact on the final use
of rights and resources and will influence the extent of economic dead-
weight losses. Most notably, Calabresi and Melamed point out that, in the
presence of positive transaction costs, the choice between property-type
and liability-type remedies has important efficiency consequences.
4
9 New York Times Co. v. Tasini, 533 U.S. 483 (2001).
91See John D. Shuff & Geoffrey T. Holtz, Copyright Tensions in the Digital
Age, 34 AKRON L. REv. 555,562 (2001).
9' Tasini, 533 U.S. at 519.
9 See, e.g., Boomer v. Atlantic Cement Co., 257 N.E.2d 870 (N.Y. 1970)
(opting to award damages rather than an injunction to plaintiffs complaining about
pollution caused by a local cement factory).
' Guido Calabresi & A. Douglas Melamed, Property Rules, Liability Rules,
and Inalienability: One View of the Cathedral, 85 HARV. L. REv. 1089, 1092
(1972). The authors outline a scheme with three kinds of entitlements: property,
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A. Remedies andAsymmetric Transaction Costs
1. Theory
In the realm of entropy and property fragmentation, positive transaction
costs often generate a one-directional stickiness in the transfer of legal
entitlements. As discussed above, pricing externalities and holdouts are two
major impediments to transfers, which are directly related to each other in
the anticommons setting. The optimal legal remedy should aim at minimiz-
ing the net social cost of such externality and holdout costs in any
particular institutional setting. Quite interestingly, the asymmetry may
justify the selective use of different remedies for the same entitlement or
relationship, as this hybrid approach is a potential instrument for correcting
the asymmetric frictions encountered in the transfer of such rights. In this
setting, legal rules may offer different remedial protection in two legal
situations that first appear equivalent because the asymmetric strategic and
transactional impediments to the transfer of such rights justify the differing
treatment of apparently identical legal positions.' The Supreme Court in
Tasini underlined this point by quoting language in Campbell v. Acuff-Rose
Music, Inc. to the effect that "goals of copyright law are 'not always best
served by automatically granting injunctive relief.' ""
This Article posits that courts and legislators, consciously or uncon-
sciously, take the asymmetric effects of property fragmentation into
liability, and inalienable rights. The owner of a property-type entitlement can sell
it at will for whatever price the market will bear; a property-type remedy, such as
an order for specific performance or an injunction, can only be transferred with the
owner's consent, at the price he demands. Liability-type remedies, such as
damages, place control in the hands of the actor wanting the right, who can act
against the will of the person who holds the entitlement, so long as he is willing to
pay the price in the form of damages that are set by the state through the courts. Id
at 1092. Finally, certain entitlements, such as personal liberty, cannot be transferred
or sold, even if the holder would want to do so. Id at 1092-93. These well-known
considerations have provided the basis for much ofthe common wisdom during the
last twenty-five years in the law and economics profession. Over the same period,
however, several scholars have challenged the validity of the Calabresi-Melamed
framework, pointing to the limitations of liability-type protection. These critiques
have led to various refinements of the original 1972 Calabresi-Melamed frame-
work, which shall be taken into consideration in the present analysis. In spite of
such challenges, however, the gist of the original proposition remains standing.
9 See Coase, supra note 30, at 15.
96 Tasini, 533 U.S. at 519 (quoting Campbell v. Acuff-Rose Music, Inc., 510
U.S. 569, 578 n.10 (1994)).
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account when considering the best legal rules to apply in a given situation.97
This efficiency hypothesis further predicts the emergence of a dual regime
of remedies to compensate for the one-directional stickiness in the parties'
exchanges in several situations related to contract and property law. When
transaction costs are asymmetric, legal systems should take into consider-
ation their "direction" (i.e., the relative cost of reallocating entitlements
from one party to the other), rather than the total transaction costs faced by
all of the parties.98 This is done in order to minimize the welfare losses
occasioned by such asymmetric stickiness, thus preventing the effects of
entropy and persistent property fragmentation."
2. Practice: Penn Central and Calumet Bank
The approach of the Indiana legislature seems to have been guided by
unequal transaction costs when it passed a statute allowing property owners
97 This same instinct can be seen in a different setting in which the Court of
Appeals for Florida's Fifth District reversed a lower court decision against a
landowner who complained that he had not received sufficient notice of an
issuance of a tax deed for the subsurface property rights of his land. Cape Atl.
Landowners Ass'n v. County of Volusia, 481 So. 2d 1384 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App.
1991). The court construed the statute to show a "preference" for reunification of
the fee and subsurface rights, thereby giving the fee owner "preferential treatment"
in purchasing the tax certificate. The court found thatjustbecause subsurface rights
could be taxed separately, that did not mean that the county did not have an
obligation to provide sufficient notice so that owners could reunite the fee. The
court was making every effort to prevent the anomalous result of having two parties
own surface and subsurface rights, a clearly inefficient property fragmentation.
9 In a companion case to the railroad abandonment decisions described in the
following section, the Supreme Court of Indiana decided in Consolidated Rail
Corp. v. Lewellen, 682 N.E.2d 779 (Ind. 1997), that any language in a deed limiting
or describing the purpose of the transfer meant that a right of way (easement) rather
than a fee simple was transferred. In an effort to promote the unification of
property, the court found that the railroad had been responsible for drafting the
original deeds, so that the documents would be interpreted in favor ofthe grantors,
i.e., presuming a right of way, which would be extinguished with the railroad,
rather than a fee simple, which would not.
" For instance, in Calumet National Bank v. American Telephone & Telegraph
Co., 682 N.E.2d 785 (Ind. 1997), described in greater detail below, the court
interpreted the common law to mandate that property owners abutting abandoned
rail lines automatically recover a fee simple from the mid-point of the railway to
their property line, absent a deed stipulating that the railway had received a fee
simple at the time of the original transfer of interest, thus expediting the reunifica-
tion of property rights. Idx at 788.
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to file an affidavit to reclaim land that had been used by railroads for its
tracks once the Interstate Commerce Commission certified that the railroad
was no longer in operation."°' The idea was to avoid a situation character-
ized by classic asymmetric transaction costs: multiple landowners trying to
reunify their property from a buyer, the railroad, now turned seller.
Although the railroad held many essentially unusable strips of land, they
were nonetheless highly desired by the property owners abutting the
defunct railroad tracks.
The Seventh Circuit, in Penn Central Corp. v. US. Railroad Vest
Corp., struck down the statute because of procedures for its implementa-
tion, not its underlying purpose.'0 ' The court clearly stated that it did not
"disparage the statute's objectives," acknowledging that "it is desirable to
eliminate clouds on title and divided ownership,"'0 but held that six
months was insufficient time for Penn Central to defend against owners
who were trying to take land that the railroad might actually own, as
opposed to land for which it had merely secured a right of way. In its
opinion striking down the law, the Seventh Circuit nevertheless denounced
the risk of entropy and persistent fragmentation, observing:
If the railroad holds title in fee simple to a multitude of skinny strips of
land now usable only by the owner of the surrounding or adjacent land,
then before the strips can be put to their best use there must be expensive
and time-consuming negotiation between the railroad and its neigh-
bor-that or the gradual extinction of the railroad's interest through the
operation of adverse possession.'
04
The Seventh Circuit therefore showed where it drew the line between
facilitating the unification of property and correcting the asymmetry in
transaction costs and undermining basic ownership rights. It issued an
injunction against the further filing of affidavits, choosing a property-type
remedy that reaffirmed Penn Central's possible entitlement to the land,
which it could then sell to the highest bidder.0 5 The court assumed that the
majority of the deeds in question were, in fact, rights of way that would
dissolve upon the abandonment of the railroad, making it easier to opt to
1oo IND. CODE § 8-4-35-4 (1987).
'o' Penn Cent. Corp. v. U.S. R.R. Vest Corp., 955 F.2d 1158 (7th Cir. 1992).
1id at 1163.
103 Id
'04 Id at 1160.
105 Id at 1164.
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defend ownership rights at the risk of high transaction costs caused by the
asymmetry between the railroad and the landowners."°
The court indicated, however, that the legislature had not stepped far
over that line, noting that it would be "simple enough for the State of
Indiana to devise a quick and cheap procedure,"'"7 namely some kind of
pre-deprivation hearing that would allow the railroad to document the
acquisition oftitle to the property, rather than just a right of way. With this
protection, the statutory mechanism could function fairly and constitution-
ally, while achieving its objective of eliminating the transaction costs that
otherwise might hinder this socially beneficial property reunification 8
The court therefore paved the way for another property-type remedy,
namely vesting presumption of title in the owners of the abutting property
rather than in the railroad.
Another abandoned railroad case, involving AT&T and Calumet
National Bank, had a similar fact pattern, yet the Supreme Court of Indiana
resolved the case using a more conventional damages approach to
remedy."° In that instance, Calumet Bank, acting in its capacity as a trustee
for property owners, sued AT&T for trespass for installing fiber optic
cables along the railroad line that had been abandoned by Conrail."'
Although Conrail had purported to transfer its right of way to AT&T, its
privilege to use the land had ended two years earlier when the Interstate
Commerce Commission authorized it to abandon the railroad."' As AT&T
had already set up the cable and demonstrated the public need for it,"' the
court found that damages were the proper remedy.113 Unburdened by
considerations about asymmetric transaction costs and the ensuing one-
dimensional stickiness in reunifying property rights, the court was able to
resolve the dispute using a more efficient liability-type remedy. These two
cases therefore provide an illustration of the hypothesis that courts will
treat cases stemming from similar contexts differently depending on the
direction of the transaction costs involved.
3. Practice: Tasini
These two cases also provide interesting guidance for the district court.
The situation in Tasini echoes the Calumet case in important ways: the New
06 Id at 1159.107Id at 1163.
108 Id[
109 Calumet Nat'l Bank v. Am. Tel. & Tel. Co., 682 N.E.2d 785 (Ind. 1997).
0 Id at 787.
" Id at 791.
12 Id at 787.
3Id at 792.
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York Times transferred a right that it did not have to a third party, who then
used it in a way that contributed to the public good, in addition to its own
profitability." 4 This parallels Conrail'stransferto AT&T ofproperty rights
that it did not have. The Supreme Court of Indiana found that damages
were an appropriate way to compensate the true owners, while allowing the
benefit of the cable lines to remain accessible to the public.
In the Penn Central case, the basic framework is the inverse of Tasini:
multiple owners who are at risk of not being able to reunify their property
rights. Nevertheless, the basic message of the court, the importance of
reunifying property rights in an efficient manner, resonates here. The
Seventh Circuit issued an injunction but noted that a mechanism for the
adjudication of each claim would be a sufficient solution to the problem.
A similar solution has been suggested in the Tasini case, namely the
creation of a clearinghouse which would be responsible for identifying and
enforcing the rights of the scattered freelance writers." ' In short, the district
court would seem to have some roadmaps out of this dilemma at its
disposal.
IV. TRANSACTION COST AND ANTICOMMONS ANALYSIS:
FAIR USE AND THE SCOPE OF THE SOLUTION"
6
A. Introduction
Both sides to the Tasini controversy agree that finding a way to
reconcile the copyright interests of the freelance authors with the preserva-
tion of the integrity of the nation's electronic historical record is an
important challenge. The majority and dissenting opinions, however, reveal
the limitations of relying solely on statutory construction to resolve the
question. Such an approach offers the choice of a strained reading of the
statute to avoid complications in preserving the country's historical record
or a straightforward reading that could have unfortunate repercussions. A
more creative approach, hinted at during oral argument, might have
provided a better solution.
"" The amicus brief of Authors Guild, Inc. provides a full consideration of
profit motive in this case. See Brief of Amidi Curiae Authors Guild, Inc. et al. at
10, New York Times Co. v. Tasini, 533 U.S. 483 (2001) (No. 00-201).
11 Some have suggested that the answer is the creation of licensing coop-
eratives for free-lance writers. See, e.g., May, supra note 84, at 26.
"6 The discussion in this section is adopted from Ben Depoorter & Francesco
Parisi, Fair Use and Copyright Protection: A Price Theory Explanation (2001)
(unpublished manuscript, on file with author), available at http://www.gmu.edu/
departnents/law/faculty/papers/docs/01-03.pdf.
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During the Tasini oral argument, one Justice brought up the possibility
of the fair use doctrine as a possible solution to what has been referred to
as the Petitioners' "Chinese Cultural Revolution" argument." The Justice
wanted to know what the difference would be between downloading an
article from an electronic database and photocopying it in the library,
essentially querying whether it would be an option to place the onus of
respecting the author's copyright on the user, subject to the exceptions
enunciated by the fair use doctrine."' The majority brushed over this line
of legal reasoning, stating that a database is a commercial venture and
therefore not entitled to the exceptions given to libraries under fair use."9
Furthermore, the publishers did not assert a fair use defense,120 an oversight
that will be discussed below. In his dissent, Justice Stevens echoed the fair
use rationale, stating that the user and purpose ultimately must be the
determining factors.' Just as someone can print out certain frames of a
microfilm, he can download certain pages from an article in an electronic
database; both contain various editions of publications juxtaposed
together." Ultimately, the user must be responsible for not infringing
copyright; violation cannot be attributed to the medium, be it paper,
microfilm, or electronic database."
B. The Relevance of the Fair Use Doctrine to Tasini
The doctrine of fair use, codified in 17 U.S.C. § 107, allows "fair" use
and reproduction of copyrighted works for purposes such as criticism,
comment, news reporting, teaching, scholarship, and research. 24 A fair use,
17 Oral ArgumentTranscript at 33-34, New York Times Co. v. Tasini, 533 U.S.
483 (2001) (No. 00-201).
... Wendy J. Gordon, Fine-tuning Tasini: Privileges ofElectronic Distribution
andReproduction, 66 BROOK. L. REv. 473,475-76 (2000) (arguing that publishers
cannot use fair use as a defense because, even assuming a right of reproduction,
they do not have the separately cognizable right to distribution).
"9 New York Times Co. v. Tasini, 533 U.S. 483, 517 (2001).
2AId at 515.
121 Id at 527 (Stevens, J., dissenting).
'2See id (Stevens, J., dissenting).See id (Stevens, J., dissenting). The majority was not convinced by this line
of argument, noting that just because a third party could print out the New York
Times by date, thereby preservingthe collective nature of the work (anoninfringing
document), does not mean that the database is not infringing. Id at 518-19.
124 17 U.S.C. § 107 (1994). Some authors consider the applicability of the
doctrine of fair use to be the defining characteristic of intellectual property, as
compared to other property rights in tangible resources. See Dane S. Ciolino,
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although technically forbidden by copyright law, will not be considered
copyright infringement.'" (Other legal systems contain comparable legal
rules limiting the scope of copyright protection, such as the French "droit
de citation" and the British right of "parody.")
The statute provides limited guidance on what constitutes fair use,
providing only an open-ended, non-determinative list of precedential
factors: (1) the purpose and character of the use, including whether it is
commercial or for non-profit educational purposes; (2) the nature of the
copyrighted work itself; (3) whether the section used constitutes a
substantial portion of the work as a whole; and (4) the effect of the use
upon the potential market for, and value of, the copyrighted work. 126 The
statute does not provide express instructions for weighing each of the
elements but, rather, relies on courts to develop further the substance of the
doctrine, as judges did prior to the 1976 codification. 27
Bringing up fair use in the Tasini context is interesting because, as a
rule, when new technological advances in the dissemination of information
conflict with the precepts of standard copyright law, the doctrine of fair
use, which delineates limited circumstances under which the work may be
Rethinking the Compatability ofMoral Rights and Fair Use, 54 WASH. & LEE L.
REV. 33, 56-57 (1997); see also Michael G. Anderson & Paul F. Brown, The
Economics Behind Copyright Fair Use: A Principled and Predictable Body of
Law, 24 Loy. U. CHi. L.J. 143, 158 (1993) (noting that fair use is a"necessary part
of copyright law, the observance of which is essential to achieve the goals of that
law"); Lydia Pallas Loren, Redefining the Market Failure Approach to Fair Use
in an Era of Copyright Permission Systems, 5 J. INTELL. PROP. L. 1, 4 (1997)
(considering it to be critical to copyright's fundamental purpose of promoting the
progress of knowledge and learning: "[fair use is] one of the most important
counterbalances to the rights granted to copyright owners").
" The doctrine of fair use shares with mandatory licensing, reverse engineer-
ing, and prohibition of copyright misuse the common purpose of strikng a balance
between the veto right of the intellectual property rights holder and the public
interest in dissemination of the work.
126 17 U.S.C. § 107 (1994).
127 See H.R. REP. No. 94-1476, at 66 (1976), reprinted in 1976 U.S.C.C.A.N.
5659, 5680. As the House noted, "the endless variety of situations and combina-
tions of circumstances that can arise in particular cases precludes the formulation
of exact rules in the statute." Id. The House Report further noted that "the courts
must be free to adapt the doctrine to particular situations on a case-by-case basis."
Id For an overview of the manner in which courts weighed the various individual
factors up to 1982, see Wendy J. Gordon, Fair Use as Market Failure: A
Structural and Economic Analysis of the Betamax Case and Its Predecessors, 82
COLUM. L. REv. 1600, 1604 (1982).
2001-2002]
KENTUCKY LAW JOURNAL
used without the author's permission, is called upon to reconcile the two.
Although there is agreement that fair use is a potential tool, proponents of
new technology and copyright holders generally favor narrowing the scope
of the fair use defense.'28
Ironically, at the same time that fair use is seen as a way to reconcile
technology and copyright issues, the mass popularization of the Internet and
continued technological advances in information dissemination has
produced a new argument that fair use will become obsolete in a world
where one-click technology provides instantaneous communication
between copyright holders and users. Universally accessible Internet
gateways will allegedly provide copyright holders the opportunity to charge
users of their works licensing fees in quasi-automatic fashion, eliminating
the transaction-cost argument that provides one of the main pragmatic
justifications of fair use. In turn-the argument goes-the traditional
rationales for the existence of fair use doctrine will lose their persuasive
power. 129
128 Generally, the key role of fair use in resolving tension between new
technology and traditional copyright is well appreciated. See Adrienne J. Marsh,
Fair Use and New Technology: The Appropriate Standards to Apply, 5 CARDOZO
L. REv. 635, 635-36 (1984) ("Successful resolution of the resulting tension
between products of the new technologies and copyright law will depend largely
on the doctrine of fair use.").
'29 See Tom W. Bell, Fair Use vs. Fared Use: The Impact ofAutomated Rights
Management on Copyright's Fair Use Doctrine, 76 N.C. L. REv. 557 (1998)
(arguing that fair use will, to a large extent, be replaced by "fared use," where
automated rights management will become the dominant instrument for copyright
transfer); Edmund W. Kitch, Can the Internet Shrink Fair Use, 78 NEB. L. REV.
880 (1999) (examining the potential effect of both a structural approach (i.e.,
denying fair use treatment when the copyright owner could have established
Internet permission) and a transactional one (i.e., where fair use falters only in
situations where Internet permissions are easily available) in leading to a reduced
scope of fair use); Robert P. Merges, The EndofFriction? Property Rights and the
Contract in the "Newtonian" World of On-Line Commerce, 12 BERKELEYTECH.
L.J. 115 (1997) (pondering the reduced role of fair use, while proposing a new,
subsidy-oriented, foundation for the fair use doctrine that would better emphasize
the doctrine's redistributional concerns); David Post, Battle or Dance?, 116 AM.
LAW., Jan./Feb. 1996 (arguing that automated rights management techniques
drastically reduce transaction costs of negotiating licence fees, thereby calling into
question the role of fair use). But see Jonathan Dowell, Comment, Bytes and
Pieces: Fragmented Copies, Licensing, and Fair Use in a Digital World, 86 CAL.
L. REV. 843 (1998) (examining the prospect offair use in the context offragmented
literal copying of small chunks of content, concluding that the cost-minimization
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C. Fair Use and the Anticommons Dilemma
It appears, however, that the fair use doctrine might have further
economic justification that has not been captured by the one-dimensional
argument that the economic rationale for the fair use doctrine has been
lost. 30 The tragedy of the anticommons demonstrates that fair use remains
valuable even in the digital context of automated rights management. As
Buchanan and Yoon suggest, the anticommons is a useful metaphor for
understanding why potential economic value may "disappear into the 'black
hole' of resource underutilization."'' In light of the anticommons insight,
fair use doctrine retains a valid efficiency justification even in a zero
transaction cost environment. Fair use defenses can be regarded as
justifiable and instrumental in minimizing the welfare losses occasioned by
the strategic behavior of the copyright holders. Even if copyright licenses
can be transferred at no cost (for instance, in a "click and pay" frictionless
computer world), the strategic behavior of the copyright holders would still
create possible deadweight losses that the fair use doctrine can mitigate.
Copyright owners, such as the freelancers in Tasini, will have complete
control over their work, leading to veto power over its use. If substitute
works are available, namely similar articles which convey the same
information and point of view, the authors will simply be opting out of a
market in which price is set at the competitive equilibrium. If, however, the
authors hold control over works that are complementary to others (i.e., their
contribution enhances that of others), then they can block access to these
works, causing deadweight loss. Because they do not have any way to
coordinate with other copyright owners, absent some sort of copyright
clearinghouse, this could well lead to an anticommons situation.
In order to assess the extent of the anticommons problem, it is
important to know whether the works of the freelance writers which are in
question are strictly complementary to each other, or if it is possible to get
substitutes for them. The unitary basis of the problem can be understood
when thinking of the traditional structure of a property right, in which
function of automated licensing does not take into consideration the public benefit
purpose of fair use).
130 The briefs in preparation for the Supreme Court oral arguments do not
mention fair use, but the amicus briefs do draw on the concept. See infra notes 135,
139 and accompanying text.
' Buchanan & Yoon, supra note 76, at 2. Parisi, Schulz and Depoorter have
explored the extent of such underutilization in different anticommons cases. See
PARISi ET AL., supra note 36.
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owners enjoy a "bundle of rights" which include, among other things, the
right to use their property and the right to exclude others from it. In such a
framework, the owner's dual rights are exercised over the same domain and
are complementary. Whenever property is created or otherwise partitioned
in such away as to place complementary components of the property in the
hands of different individuals, inefficiency may result and the discrepancy
between the rights of use and the rights of exclusion held by the various
owners is likely to produce welfare losses.1
32
Ultimately, it is the readers and researchers of the future who will
determine the extent of the anticommons problem in the Tasini case. For
instance, Jonathan Tasini writes about labor disputes. If someone is content
to know the basics about labor unions, it is likely that it will be possible to
get the information in Mr. Tasini's articles elsewhere, thereby dissipating
Mr. Tasini's bargaining power to secure additional copyright revenue from
his work, as NEXIS would simply decline to include his pieces in its
electronic collection. If, however, Mr. Tasini's work complements general
information about labor unions, as it provides more in-depth analysis or
specialized information, then Mr. Tasini has more bargaining power.
Unfortunately, if the copyrights are in a relationship of complementarity in
the production ofa derivative work, namely desired in-depth elaboration of
general current events, then it would lead to anticommons pricing, making
both society and the individual copyright sellers worse off.'
132 Furthermore, it has been suggested that problems of inefficient fragmen-
tation (be they cases of insufficient fragmentation, such as the commons, or
excessive fragmentation, such as the anticommons) are not confined to situations
of insufficient or excessive fragmentation of real assets, but they can result from
the dismemberment-and resulting nonconformity-between the internal
entitlements of the property right. The qualitative results of these models represent
limit points along a continuum, each characterized by different levels of discrep-
ancy between use and exclusion rights, with welfare losses varying accordingly.
PARISi ET AL., supra note 36, at 6; see also Heller, supra note 34.
' The anticommons equilibrium pricing is, in fact, the outcome ofa prisoner's
dilemma problem that the individual copyright sellers face when pricing their
copyrights independently from one another. As in a traditional prisoner's dilemma
game, the inability of copyright holders to coordinate prices produces a result that
is both privately and socially inefficient. Quite strikingly, in this case the
competitive outcome is socially inefficient, even if compared to the alternative
monopoly equilibrium. Competitive pricing of the complementary goods generates
a substantially larger social loss than the monopolistic equilibrium.
If the copyrights are substitutes in the production function of the derivative
work, the inability of the copyright sellers to coordinate their prices will also be
detrimental for them. Unlike the complementarity case considered above, however,
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D. Fair Use and the Selective Use of Remedies in Copyright Protection
In most legal systems, copyright law provides a copyright holder a vast
choice of remedies against infringement of his work, including property-
type remedies (e.g., injunctions to restrain the infringer from violating his
rights or even the impoundment and destruction of the unauthorized
reproductions of his work) and liability-type remedies (e.g., actions to
recover the actual damages and to disgorge the additional profits realized
by the copyright infringer or to collect statutory damages). In the United
States, all of the above choices of remedies are made available by the
Copyright Act, which also provides that, in a civil action for copyright
infringement, a court may grant temporary and final injunctions to prevent
or restrain infringement of a copyright.' It is to this range of choice that
those supporting the Respondents turn in order to find a solution to the
present dilemma.
The results of this Article suggest that a selective use of remedies may
be appropriate to minimize the effect offragmentation and strategic pricing.
As a matter of ideal theory, anticommons losses will result from the
imposition of property-type remedies (i.e., injunctions). If copyright owners
are given only a damage remedy for the infringement of their work, there
is no opportunity for strategic pricing and thus no anticommons deadweight
loss. If liability-type remedies are limited, the infringer has considerable
leverage with the copyright owner because he always has the option to use
without permission and pay damages. Under a liability rule, the prospective
buyer of a copyright license could not be induced to pay more than the cost
of his expected liability for copyright infringement. At the limit, a
copyright holder can obtain a judicial declaration of his rights, but the
defendant can persist in the violation simply by paying damages. In
contrast, in the case of property-type (i.e., injunction) protection, a
copyright license can be obtained only if the current owner agrees to sell
it at the price he demands. Absent such agreement, an owner could obtain
an injunction to enforce his rights upon proof of a valid copyright. Under
such a regime, strategic pricing of multiple complementary copyrights
could lead to substantial dissipation of value.
the competition among copyright sellers would be beneficial for society at large.
In this case, in fact, the substitutability of the copyrights as inputs of production
leads to the usual negative price effect. The resulting equilibrium-albeit Pareto
inferior for all the players-is socially preferable to the alternative monopoly
outcome.
134 18 AM. JUR. 2D Copyright and Literary Property § 221 (1985).
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In fact, opting for a liability-type remedy is precisely the kind of
solution suggested by the American Library Association ("ALA") in its
amicus brief to the Court. Recognizing that providing an injunction would
cause complications in terms of negotiating use with each author, the ALA
argued that the "courts and/or the parties can devise and administer a
system of monetary relief to compensate freelance authors for past acts of
copying and distribution of their works and pay them continuing royalties
for future use of their works."' 35 As a justification for this approach, the
ALA cited Campbell v. Acuff-Rose Music, Inc.,'36 in which the Court stated
that "the goals of copyright law are not always best served by automatically
granting injunctive relief."'37 In that case, the defendant's argument that his
parody was protected by fair use was not so unreasonable as to warrant an
injunction. The Court recognized a public interest in maintaining access to
the defendant's work.'38 The ALA argued that the same rationale should be
used in Tasini.39 Presumably because electronic databases meet some of
the fair use criteria (e.g., educational purpose), the appropriate solution
would be to attach a price to the use of the material rather than prevent
access to it altogether. The Tasini majority picked up on the argument,
citing Campbell when remanding the case, a hint that it would provide
appropriate guidance in crafting the ultimate remedy.1" As Professor Mark
Lemley points out, one might prefer compulsory licensing as a means for
solving the anticommons problem since, if fair use prevails, the copyright
owner cannot recover any money for the use. The drawback is that the
administrative costs of compulsory licensing have made people reluctant
to embrace the approach. Professor Lemley responds, however, that (1)
litigating the fair use issue almost certainly costs no more than compulsory
licensing and (2) copyright law has a lot of compulsory licenses already,
and they seem to be administered reasonably well through arbitration
panels or private settlement.' Even though a broad fair use doctrine may
'35 Brief of Amici Curiae American Library Ass'n and the Ass'n of Research
Libraries at 4, New York Times Co. v. Tasini, 533 U.S. 483 (2001) (No. 00-20 1).
1
36 Campbell v. Acuff-Rose Music, Inc., 510 U.S. 569 (1994).
,a7 Id. at 578 n.10.
138 Id
39 Brief of Amici Curiae American Library Ass'n and the Ass'n of Research
Libraries at 13-14, New York Times v. Tasini, 533 U.S. 483 (2001) (No. 00-201).
"4 New York Times Co. v. Tasini, 533 U.S. 483, 519 (2001).
,41 For an argument that we ought to abolish both fair use and all injunctions in
copyright cases, thus making everything a compulsory license, see Alex Kozinski
& Christopher Newman, What's So Fair About Fair Use?, 46 J. COPYRIGHT SOC'Y
513 (1999). For another solution to the anticommons problem, Professor Robert
[VOL. 90
LESSONS FROM THE ANTICOMMONS
discourage litigation of clear-cut cases, a broad compulsory licensing
system may still necessitate adjudication.
The lesson to be drawn, therefore, is that legal systems should not
change the scope of the fair use defense or the choice of remedy in case of
infringement, even with decreasing transaction costs in an increasingly
electronic marketplace. Rather, the doctrine of fair use should be a bridge
between traditional copyright enforcement and protection in the Digital
Age. Leaving both the scope of fair use and the arsenal of copyright
remedies unchanged could minimize anticommons losses; conversely, a
reduction in the scope of fair use defenses might have the effect of
increasing them. In such a case, the use of liability-type remedies in the
new domains of copyright protection would help contain the deadweight
losses from strategic pricing.14 As Tasini demonstrates, this scenario is far
from theoretical.
V. CONCLUSION
Viewing property law through the lens of economic analysis highlights
the difficulties associated with balancing economic efficiency with the
realities of high transaction costs and other situations in which the various
actors involved are precluded from reaching an efficient agreement.
Understanding the tendency towards entropy and the characteristics of an
anticommons situation sheds light on why the common law has developed
Merges has considered collective rights organizations, in which disparate
rightholders organize into blanket licensing societies. Robert P. Merges, Contract-
ing Into Liability Rules: Intellectual Property Rights and Collective Rights
Organizations, 84 CAL. L. REV. 1293 (1996).
'42 The above prediction is consistent with the observation of remedies in real
property, where the limited protection given to atypical (or innominate) rights still
characterizes the modem day law of remedies in both common law and civil law
jurisdictions. Parisi, supra note 28. Professors of property law often cite this fact
as one of the many unexplained puzzles of their field, assuming that availability of
liability-type remedies for certain categories of real rights is merely coincidental.
Id In a popular textbook on property, Dwyer and Menell observe that "[b]ecause
of one of the many historical accidents that plague property law, real covenants are
enforced by a damages remedy only." JOHN P. DWYER & PETER S. MENELL,
PROPERTY LAW AND POLICY: A COMPARATIVE INSTITUTIONAL PERSPECTIVE 760
(1998). We suggest that these anomalies are not merely happenstance, given the
existence of strategic impediments in the reunification of fragmented rights. In the
intellectual property context, these strategic impediments are most pervasive in
cases of production or consumption complementarities.
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certain rules and how these norms, which may be initially puzzling, are in
fact effective responses to potentially difficult questions. Courts are
beginning to use these concepts as practical tools in resolving cases. As
demonstrated by the Tasini case, anticommons analysis, in particular,
illuminates the way to crafting ajudicial remedy that will be faithful to the
letter of the Copyright Act and will avoid collateral damage in terms of
restricting access to a vast and important store of information. In particular,
anticommons theory demonstrates that the doctrine of fair use, far from
being obsolete, has promise as an important bridge between traditional and
digital copyright protection.
